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According to the enactive approach to cognitive science, perception is essentially a
skillful engagement with the world. Learning how to engage via a human-computer
interface (HCI) can therefore be taken as an instance of developing a new mode of
experiencing. Similarly, social perception is theorized to be primarily constituted by skillful
engagement between people, which implies that it is possible to investigate the origins
and development of social awareness using multi-user HCIs. We analyzed the trial-by-trial
objective and subjective changes in sociality that took place during a perceptual crossing
experiment in which embodied interaction between pairs of adults was mediated over a
minimalist haptic HCI. Since that study required participants to implicitly relearn how to
mutually engage so as to perceive each other’s presence, we hypothesized that there
would be indications that the initial developmental stages of social awareness were
recapitulated. Preliminary results reveal that, despite the lack of explicit feedback about
task performance, there was a trend for the clarity of social awareness to increase over
time. We discuss the methodological challenges involved in evaluating whether this trend
was characterized by distinct developmental stages of objective behavior and subjective
experience.
Keywords: social cognition, joint action, social interaction, intersubjectivity, second-person perspective,
consciousness, developmental psychology
INTRODUCTION
Theories about the primacy of embodied interaction over
detached social cognition have grown in popularity. For example,
there are interaction theory and the narrative practice hypoth-
esis (Gallagher and Hutto, 2008), the concepts of participatory
sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007) and self-other
co-determination (Thompson, 2001), the formal methods of
interpersonal synergies (Riley et al., 2011) and social coordina-
tion dynamics (Oullier and Kelso, 2009), and the second-person
approach to neuroscience (Schilbach et al., 2013). Closely related
to this emphasis on embodiment and social interaction is the
hypothesis of direct perception of other minds (Gallagher, 2008a;
Krueger, 2012; Stout, 2012), which holds that perceptual social
experience normally takes precedence over, and provides the con-
crete basis for, reflective social cognition such as simulating and
theorizing. These theories thereby doubly break with psychology’s
traditional emphasis on an individual’s thinking as the essential
basis of social awareness (e.g., Wegner and Giuliano, 1982).
These theories, which accord primacy to social perceptual
interaction in adult social cognition, are naturally comple-
mented by theories that accord primacy to this social per-
ceptual interaction in the development of social cognition in
infancy (Gallagher, 2008b). For example, preverbal infants’
understanding of other minds is argued to originate and develop
within mutual engagement (Reddy and Morris, 2004), second-
person interaction (Fuchs, 2013), and primary intersubjectivity
(Trevarthen, 1979). Within this context of co-regulated activity
an infant’s intentions can emerge and be realized in joint action
(Fogel, 1993). Again, this kind of embodied interaction is not
conceived as a purely unconscious phenomenon, since an infant’s
movement always already implies a certain form of animation and
affectivity (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999). Rather, embodied interac-
tion is seen as going hand in hand with the development of what
has been called dyadic states of consciousness (Tronick, 2004) and
self-other conscious affect (Reddy, 2003). A similar emphasis on
the developmental precedence of communal embodied coupling
before self-other differentiation can be found in the phenomeno-
logical psychology of Merleau-Ponty (1964). By extending his
account to prenatal development, it can even be argued that the
maternal body and fetal body are already situated in an embodied
interaction that is affectively structured through the negotiated
movements themselves (Lymer, 2011).
The primacy of embodied-social-perceptual interaction is
therefore supported by a variety of empirical and theoretical
traditions that are progressively being integrated into a cohe-
sive research program (Froese and Gallagher, 2012). However,
while this emerging framework is compelling for many, from
the mainstream perspective it still needs to further prove its
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worth compared to the traditional framework by making unique
predictions that are experimentally verified.
Following the enactive approach, we have recently provided
evidence for the interactive constitution of intersubjective aware-
ness in pairs of adults using a minimal haptic human-computer
interface (HCI) (Froese et al., 2014), namely an experimental
setup which is known as the “perceptual crossing paradigm”
(Auvray and Rohde, 2012). Subsequently, given the close the-
oretical link between interactive approaches in cognitive sci-
ence and developmental psychology, we hypothesized that the
same kind of setup could also provide insights into the early
development of intersubjective awareness. Promisingly, related
research with pairs of interacting adults has shown that it is
indeed possible to study the development of new communica-
tion systems (Galantucci and Garrod, 2011), including on the
basis of purely embodied interactions (Iizuka et al., 2013). We
were therefore interested to determine whether some prelim-
inary evidence to support this hypothesis could be found by
extending the analysis of our original experiment to include
diachronic aspects of the interaction process. Given a trial-by-trial
analysis, would we find indications of a sequence of develop-
mental stages of social awareness, such as those proposed by
interaction-oriented developmental psychologists? We derived
the specific form of our hypothesis on the basis of the following
considerations.
It has been argued that the phenomenal quality of percep-
tion is largely constituted by the specific dynamical form of its
underlying sensorimotor skill, rather than just by a dedicated
biological organ and/or neural system (e.g., O’Regan and Noë,
2001; Noë, 2004; Mcgann, 2010). Moreover, it follows that if
perceptual experience is indeed constituted by skillful sensorimo-
tor interaction then incorporating some form of mediation into
that embodied interaction will result in a corresponding mod-
ulation of that experience. Learning how to practically engage
the world via new tools, HCI, and other mediating systems1 is
associated with the emergence of new ways of being in and
experiencing the world, that is, technology is conceived as anthro-
pologically constitutive (Havelange, 2010). Somemodulations are
relatively subtle changes in perceptual experience (e.g., Davoli
et al., 2012), while other phenomenological changes, such as
those induced by one’s mastery of sensory substitution systems,
can be more profound (Lenay et al., 2003; Auvray and Myin,
2009). As we have observed in our research with various kinds
of HCIs, the fact that skillful usage of an HCI must first be
learned provides us with an opportunity to systematically investi-
gate the development of new modes of perceptual experiencing
(Froese et al., 2012). An added methodological bonus is that
this development can happen long after infancy, i.e., at a time
when the typical adult participants’ standard perceptual modal-
ities have normally long been formed already. This idea that
learning can recapitulate ontogeny is supported by a tradition
in psychology centered on the “microgenetic” method, which
has also observed that older individuals sometimes regress to the
1In the category of mediating system we may also include cultural modulators
of experience such as language (Bottineau, 2010), norms (Merritt, 2014), and
institutions (Gallagher, 2013).
strategies and developmental trajectories of younger individu-
als when they are learning an unfamiliar task (Miller and Coyle,
1999).
We were therefore led to the following hypothesis: if we
accept the enactive theory that social experience is constituted
by skillful interactions with others (Mcgann and De Jaegher,
2009; Froese and Di Paolo, 2011), and our proposal that learn-
ing how to co-regulate a mutual interaction by means of an
unfamiliar HCI is tantamount to re-acquiring such a social skill,
then our original perceptual crossing study should have provided
the conditions for the recapitulation of typical infants’ devel-
opmental stages of social awareness during repeated embodied
interaction by pairs of adults. In order to determine whether
this hypothesis is worthy of further systematic consideration,
we re-analyzed the objective and subjective data from our orig-
inal study in a diachronic manner. Given the post hoc nature
of this analysis, the results are only preliminary. And, while
they already look promising in some respects, they also serve to
highlight areas where more methodological fine-tuning is still
needed.
THEORY AND METHODS
Using technological interfaces has been indispensable for provid-
ing support for an interactive approach to social development.
For example, evidence for Trevarthen’s (1979) notion of primary
intersubjectivity has been obtained on the basis of his double
TV monitor paradigm, which allowed the insertion of recorded
video footage into a live face-to-face interaction (Murray and
Trevarthen, 1985). Using this kind of setup, it has repeatedly
been demonstrated that infants are sensitive to the co-regulation
of social interaction (Nadel et al., 1999). Although cognitivist
interpretations of these findings are possible, agent-based mod-
eling of Trevarthen’s experimental paradigm has contributed to
the formalization of this sensitivity in terms of dynamical sys-
tems theory (Di Paolo et al., 2008). And while such modeling can
lend formal support to a phenomenological analysis of the struc-
tures of intersubjectivity (Froese and Fuchs, 2012), what we are
still lacking is an experimental paradigm that allows researchers
to systematically investigate the development of social aware-
ness as it is experienced from the first-person (or second-person)
perspective.
Indeed, the scientific study of the development of social aware-
ness is confronted by serious methodological challenges. Only
in the last decades has there been a growing appreciation of
infant consciousness (Trevarthen and Reddy, 2007), and their
social experience has been investigated from the second-person
perspective, that is, based on the concrete experiences of develop-
mental psychologists who frequently interact with infants (Reddy,
2003; Reddy and Morris, 2004; Tronick, 2004). Clearly theories
about infant phenomenology devised through such engagement
are valuable, but it would still be desirable to verify them from
the infant’s perspective. However, in the absence of verbal skills it
is difficult if not impossible to apply the usual first- and second-
person methods used in the science of consciousness (e.g., Froese
et al., 2011). And while adult investigations of the phenomenol-
ogy of intersubjectivity provide detailed insights into how we
experience others (Ratcliffe, 2007), adults take social awareness
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for granted and can no longer remember how it had originally
developed2.
To overcome this problem we took advantage of the per-
ceptual crossing paradigm in psychology (Auvray et al., 2009),
2At least this is the case for people who do not suffer from a mental disor-
der or some other unusual condition. For example, people with schizophrenia
or with an autism-spectrum disorder tend to lack the capacity for direct
social perception (Froese et al., 2013). Yet if our hypothesis were correct, it
would suggest the intriguing possibility that this perceptual capacity could
be partially recovered by engaging in some form of embodied practice that
enhances skillful engagement with others, which is consistent with the aims of
movement therapies (Fuchs and Koch, 2014).
FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup of perceptual crossing paradigm. The
two participants can only engage with each other via a human-computer
interface that reduces their scope for embodied interaction to a bare
minimum of translational movement and tactile sensation. Each player’s
interface consists of two parts: a trackball mouse that controls the linear
displacement of their virtual avatar, and a hand-held haptic feedback device
that vibrates at constant frequency for as long as the avatar overlaps with
another virtual object and remains off otherwise. Three small lights on each
desk signal the start, halftime (30 s), and completion of each 1-min trial.
Figure adapted from Froese et al. (2014).
which has enabled researchers to systematically investigate the
real-time self-organizing dynamics of dyadic interaction by medi-
ating embodied interactions of pairs of adults over a minimal
HCI (Figure 1). Participants are embodied as avatars in a 1D vir-
tual environment (Figure 2). They can move their avatar left and
right, and they receive haptic feedback in the form of a constant
vibration to their hand for as long as their avatar overlaps with
any other virtual object (otherwise the feedback remains turned
off). Each participant can encounter three objects: their partner’s
avatar, an exact copy of the other’s avatar that moves at a constant
distance from the avatar (which we call the “shadow” object), and
a simple static object (one for each player at distinct locations).
All objects have the same size and provide the same haptic feed-
back. They can only be distinguished by means of their differing
affordances for interaction.
Participants are instructed to click in order to signal to
the experimenters when they have recognized that the object,
with which they have been interacting, is their partner’s avatar.
Participants cannot directly perceive each other’s clicks and no
feedback is provided until after the experiment. In other words, in
order to establish an embodied communication system they must
learn how to distinguish between sensations that are generated by
their own actions from those generated by themovement of exter-
nal objects (the problem of separating self from non-self), and
to distinguish external movements that express a communicative
intention from those that do not. The latter challenge not only
involves finding some responsive object as such (the problem of
detecting social contingency), but also learning how to differenti-
ate between movements made to change location and movements
made with specific communicative intent (the problem of signal-
ing signalhood). And since there is no kind of external feedback,
learning can only be guided by impressions obtained via these
interactions themselves. It is a formidable task indeed.
Methodologically, this kind of experimental approach shares
notable similarities with the microgenetic method of develop-
mental psychology (Siegler and Crowley, 1991). According to
Rosenthal (2004), the latter draws on a long tradition which had
two key methodological aims, namely “to provide the means of
FIGURE 2 | Virtual environment of perceptual crossing paradigm. Players
are virtually embodied as “avatars” on an invisible line that wraps around
after 600 units of space. Each avatar consists of a binary contact sensor and
a body object. Unbeknownst to the players a “shadow” object is attached to
each avatar body at a fixed distance of 150 units. There are also two static
objects, one for each player. All objects are 4 units long and can therefore
only be distinguished interactively in terms of their different affordances for
engagement. Figure adapted from Froese et al. (2014).
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externalizing the course of brief perceptual, or other cognitive
processes by artificially eliciting ‘primitive’ (i.e., developmentally
early) responses that are normally occulted by the final experi-
ence” and “to construct small-scale, living models of large-scale
developmental processes in such a way as to ‘miniaturize’ (i.e.,
accelerate and/or telescope) the course of a given process and
bring it under experimental control” (p. 221). Regarding the per-
ceptual crossing paradigm, the choice of asking participants to
interact via a novel, minimalist HCI is motivated by the same aims
of externalizing and recapitulating the processes underlying the
constitution of otherwise already formed perceptual experiences,
and thereby making these processes available for scientific inves-
tigation (for another example of this approach, see Lenay and
Steiner, 2010). Although it could be argued that these methods
are confusing development with learning, the distinction between
these processes of individual change is not that clear-cut. In addi-
tion, the hypothesis that the processes underlying changes that are
occurring on differing time scales share important commonali-
ties has long been a useful working hypothesis in developmental
psychology 3.
In the original experiment by Auvray et al. (2009), as well
as in several subsequent variations (for a review, see Auvray
and Rohde, 2012), it was found that differences in the relative
stability of interactions ensured that participants managed to
locate each other while avoiding the shadow and static objects.
Interaction with the static object is too stable and predictable
to be human, whereas the shadow object is too unstable since it
moves but does not respond; only the other’s avatar can respond
to contact by reacting and sticking around. Yet this interac-
tive self-organization of a situation of mutual tactile interaction
apparently did not generally coincide with the emergence of an
individual awareness of the actual presence of the other partic-
ipant. While participants signaled recognition more frequently
during mutual interaction, thereby objectively solving the task,
this could also have simply been a statistical consequence of the
fact that they spent more time inmutual interaction. Importantly,
Auvray et al.’s statistical analysis revealed that the probability of
clicking was not significantly higher after making contact with
the other player when compared with its unresponsive shadow
copy. Although it is possible that participants were genuinely
aware of having engaged with their responsive partner in some
cases, this could not be shown with the data. The results therefore
fell short of conclusively demonstrating an interactive consti-
tution of social cognition, where social cognition is conceived
as resulting in a personal-level insight (Michael and Overgaard,
2012).
On the basis of agent-based models and theoretical consider-
ations, Froese and Di Paolo (2011) hypothesized that this lack of
personal recognition of the other was to be expected given that the
experimental task was not genuinely social, at least if the mark of
the social is conceived specifically as the co-regulation of mutual
3Some developmental psychologists have even argued that, just like ontogeny
was supposed to recapitulate phylogeny (i.e., Haeckel’s biogenetic law), there
are important parallels between cognitive development and the history of
science (for a critical discussion of Piaget’s theory, see Franco and Colinvaux-
De-Dominguez, 1992). Here we restrict ourselves to comparing two processes
of change that can take place within the time scale of one individual’s lifetime.
interaction. Through their coupled behavior the pairs of partici-
pants in these studies were forming a multi-agent system of sorts,
but without any additional incentive to engage in co-regulated
joint action there was little opportunity for social experience,
and alongside it individual recognition of the other’s presence,
to emerge consistently. The original task of clicking whenever
encountering the other also allowed purely individualistic strate-
gies to be successful. For example, simply waiting until an object
repeatedly made contact, which indicates that it must be the other
because she is sensitive to one’s presence as an object in the vir-
tual space, and then clicking. However, from the searching other’s
perspective this kind of unresponsive strategy makes it impossible
to distinguish the partner as such. For a genuinely social, that is,
shared situation to emerge there has to be mutual engagement.
Froese et al. (2014) tested this hypothesis by running a per-
ceptual crossing experiment in which participants formed teams
in a tournament game and were explicitly instructed to help each
other with the task of locating each other. In this study 17 pairs
of adults completed a sequence of 15 one-minute trials. For each
trial they were asked to click once (and once only) as soon as they
became aware of the other player’s presence. After each trial in
which a participant had clicked they were asked to rate the clar-
ity of their experience of their partner on a Perceptual Awareness
Scale (PAS) that was adapted for this purpose from Ramsøy and
Overgaard (2004), and to give a short free-text description of that
experience and their strategy. Specifically, players were asked to
give a PAS rating between 1 and 4: “Please select a category to
describe how clearly you experienced your partner at the time
you clicked: (1) No experience, (2) Vague impression, (3) Almost
clear experience, (4) Clear experience.” The hypothesis was con-
firmed: clicks were significantly more probable after contact with
the other, most trials led to accurate identification of each other,
and such joint success was correlated with high ratings of clarity
of the other’s presence.
Although that study was not designed to specifically investigate
the development of social awareness, our interest in conducting
such a diachronic analysis of the results was provoked by some
of the first-person reports provided by the participants. As we
expected, there weremany reports describing forms of joint atten-
tion and joint action, for example turn-taking and imitation.
Surprisingly, however, there were also quite a few individual-
centered reports in which participants described their experience
of the other’s presence in terms of the other’s actions toward
themselves. This is a specific kind of second-person awareness
that is familiar from the developmental psychology literature.
Reddy (2003) has argued that social awareness in the first cou-
ple of months in an infant’s life primarily consists in being the
object of the other’s attention, while more advanced forms of
mutual attention, including joint attention on aspects of the social
interaction itself, develop in subsequent months. In retrospect
this finding of a possible recapitulation of the development of
social awareness is not that surprising; it follows quite naturally
from enactive theories of perception and social interaction, as we
argued in the introduction.
DIACHRONIC ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In the following we present a diachronic analysis of the perceptual
crossing study first described in Froese et al. (2014). First, we were
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interested to determine if there was an effect of implicit learning
in terms of changes in the objective results. Although partici-
pants were not given any information about the success of their
clicks during the experiment, there might still have been tenden-
cies toward improvement over the sequence of trials. Second, we
wanted to see if we could find any qualitative transformation of
user experience over trials, both in terms of PAS ratings and in
the brief first-person reports written by participants.
EVIDENCE FOR IMPLICIT LEARNING
Right at the beginning of the diachronic analysis we noticed
that there was a potential confounding factor in the way we had
designed the original study. Although we had randomized the
starting configurations of the 15 trials, we had neglected to ran-
domize the starting configurations across teams. This makes no
difference if we are interested in aggregate performance only (like
in the original study). However, when analyzing performance
over trials, there is a possibility that trends in the results were
influenced by accidental trends in the starting positions, in par-
ticular players’ initial distance to each other and to their static
objects. Although such influence cannot be ruled out in principle,
we did several tests and did not find any compelling dependency
on starting positions (for details see Supplementary Information,
Section S1). It is likely that the 60 s available during each trial were
sufficient for starting positions to be of little influence with regard
to the final outcome.
As a first step toward detecting the effects of implicit learn-
ing we can consider how the frequencies of clicks on object types
changes over the 15 trials (Figure 3). During the first half of tri-
als there is a consistent tendency toward an increasing number
of clicks on the other’s avatar. This upward trend generally con-
tinues during the second half of trials. Three of them result in
the three highest number of avatar clicks (i.e., trials 10, 11, and
13). But there is also a notable lack of consistency: all of the other
later trials resulted in notably less avatar clicks, although never
less than the very first couple of trials. Interestingly, in most cases
these later reduced successes cannot be explained by correspond-
ing increases in wrong clicks. Rather, it is the total number of
FIGURE 3 | Cumulative column chart showing changes in the number
of clicks on different targets over the 15 trials. The maximum number of
possible clicks per trial number is 34 (2 players × 17 teams). The linear
trend line refers to avatar clicks only. For details of how the different virtual
objects were determined to be the target of a click, see the methods
section in Froese et al. (2014).
clicks that is temporarily decreased (see especially trials 8 and
12). In other words, these later fluctuations seem to be partially
the result of more conservative choices: the players seem to have
implicitly learned how to identify their partner, but perhaps the
opportunity to do so did not present itself clearly enough in those
trials to warrant a click 4 . Nevertheless, even so it remains an
open question why these later moments of increased uncertainty
consistently arose across the 17 teams.
Stewart (2010) has noted that when we are talking with others
we tend to give them the benefit of the doubt that any uncertain-
ties we may have about what they meant to say will be resolved
as our interaction proceeds. After a while we may become active
participants in this process of resolution by asking: “what did you
mean when you said that. . . ?” The temporary decreases in avatar
clicks may thus reflect attempts to gain more certainty by rene-
gotiating the interaction process. Cuffari (2014) has argued that
jointly overcoming breakdowns of sense-making is intrinsic to the
emergence of shared meaning. On the basis of the first-person
reports we can see that something similar is going on here in
some cases, as forms of co-regulation emerge, stabilize, become
questioned, and dissolve again.
For example, in one session (experiment 18) two players were
trying to co-create a shared signal. After trial 3 player “b” wrote:
“I collided with a moving object but the first and second peri-
ods of the appeal were different so I recognized it was the simple
moving object and searched again” (E18T3Pb)5. Eventually the
players reached an agreement about the shape of their signal,
which is why the same player wrote self-assuredly after trial 9:
“Receiving and sending. Do either role alternately” (E18T9Pb).
However, later on doubts about whether a meaningful connec-
tion had actually been established start to creep in. After trial
14 the player explained: “Appeal and wait. But the object that I
touched generates clear three-times-signal with constant period
and it happens twice. So I did not click because I felt it was so
mechanical” (E18T14Pb).
It is interesting to note the shifting conditions of communi-
cation: the same player who earlier on rejected an interaction
because the repeated appeal was too “different” later ends up
rejecting an interaction because the already established appeal
was repeated “twice.” Of course, the other player noticed that
the signal failed to elicit the desired response: “I could not get
the good response. I felt that the partner ran away during the
trial” (E18T14Pa), and is left wondering about the reasons for this
4There are two reasons for increased conservatism of clicks compared to
the study by Auvray et al. (2009). First, players were allowed to click maxi-
mally only once per trial rather than as many times as they wished. Second,
the experiment was run as a team-based tournament game and a wrong
click meant loss of a point for the team (a correct click gained the pair of
participants a point, whereas no click left the score unchanged).
5This code uniquely identifies the first-person report. In this case it was during
(E)xperiment 18, after (T)rial 3, and written by (P)layer ‘b’. Since the origi-
nal perceptual crossing experiment was conducted at the University of Tokyo,
many first-person reports were originally written in Japanese, including those
of experiment 18 discussed here. They were translated into English by HI. The
number of experiments goes to 18, even though there were only 17 teams,
because the numbering includes a test experiment (E4) between TF and TI
that was removed from the analysis.
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breakdown: “I felt that there was an interruption while commu-
nicating. It might be because a very fast object passed or I made
a mistake” (E18T14Pa). Although it could be debated whether we
can trust subjects to report accurately about their experience and
about what is objectively going on (Jack and Roepstorff, 2003),
here we decided to give participants the benefit of the doubt.
There is no reason to assume that their reports are systematically
misleading; see, e.g., Figure 4.
We discussed this example at length because it serves to show
the complexity of the development of human communication.
We should not expect to find a linear or even smooth develop-
mental progress, since we are not dealing with machine learning
like a hill climbing algorithm. If there had been further trials, this
pair might have resolved their crisis and established another com-
munication system with renewed, and perhaps even increased,
confidence. For example, they could have meaningfully incorpo-
rated that repetition of the “three-times-signal” or even dropped
it altogether. There is no reason to assume interactive alignment
or convergence of behaviors, because progress in a coordinated
dialogue requires differentiation of interlocutors’ turns (Mills,
2014). Too much repetitive imitation may be interpreted as a fail-
ure to communicate, as we saw in this example. Both the means
and goals of social interaction change over time, and these dia-
logical changes can go beyond the intentions of the individuals
(Fusaroli et al., 2014). Relatedly, two common findings of micro-
genetic studies of learning, which are consistent with our analysis,
are the halting and uneven use of newly acquired competencies
and, more surprisingly, that changes in strategies are also often
initiated following successes rather than just failures (Siegler and
Crowley, 1991).
Another way of measuring implicit learning is by evaluating
whether the amount of co-regulated activity changed over tri-
als. For example, clicking success may come from a lucky guess,
it may be the result of an individualist strategy such as waiting
for the “prey” to trigger the sensor without moving oneself, or
it may be the outcome of reciprocal interaction and joint action.
While it is difficult to objectively differentiate between the various
possibilities, a useful heuristic is to at least distinguish between
trials in which both players were able to click successfully (“Joint
Success”) from trials were only one of the players clicked success-
fully (“Single Success”). And both of these cases can be contrasted
with clicks that were simply wrong (“Wrong Click”)6. Figure 5
shows how the number of each of these three categories changed
over the sequence of 15 trials. It reveals that there is a tendency
for trials with jointly correct clicks to increase in frequency.
This tendency toward more Joint Success could be a sign that
the players were able to develop better ways of mutually identify-
ing each other. However, arguably it could simply be contingent
on an increase in successful individualistic strategies, because
more individual successes would independently add up to more
cases in which both players click successfully, even if they did not
directly facilitate each other. Yet while this could be the explana-
tion of some cases of Joint Success, it is unlikely to be the whole
6Note that the number of Wrong Clicks is not identical with the number of
Wrong Click trials, because there were 1, 1, 1, and 2 trials with jointly wrong
clicks in trial numbers 5, 9, 14, and 15, respectively.
FIGURE 4 | Virtual trajectories over 60 s of three representative trials.
Player a (Pa) is shown as blue, while player b (Pb) is green (see Figure 2).
Solid and dashed lines represent positions of avatar and shadow objects,
respectively. Light blue and light green solid lines show the positions of the
static objects detectable by Pa and Pb, respectively. The bottom of each
plot shows the haptic feedback (on/off) received by each player. (A) In trial 3
players find each other quickly, but Pb can be seen to break off their
interaction. At no point is Pb interacting with the shadow object
(Continued)
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FIGURE 4 | Continued
(a “simple moving object”), but the unexpected irregularity of responses he
describes could be attributed to interference caused by Pa’s static object.
(B) Trial 9 begins with some difficulties as Pb briefly interacts with Pa’s
shadow object and Pa becomes distracted by his static object. Eventually
they find each other and start “receiving and sending” tactile stimuli while
adopting either role alternately. Note that their exchanged activity consists
of varying frequencies and durations. (C) In trial 14 we see two periods of
turn-taking activity. In both cases Pa keeps sending a slow and regular
“three-times-signal” while Pb’s activity is faster and more irregular. Both
times Pb abruptly departs from the interaction after a few exchanges, thus
explaining why Pa is left feeling that “the partner ran away during the trial.”
FIGURE 5 | Changes in number of different types of clicking situations
over the sequence of 15 trials. “Joint Success” shows the number of
trials where both players clicked correctly, and “Single Success” shows the
number of trials where one player clicked correctly while the other player
clicked wrongly or not at all. “Wrong Click” shows the number of wrong
clicks.
story because a strategy of trying to detect the other without
actively making oneself detectable to the other is less likely to lead
to Joint Success.
An indication of the co-dependence of correct clicks can be
gained by analyzing their temporal relationship within a trial. At
first sight the delays between jointly successful clicks support a
more interactive interpretation of the results. In most trials where
both players correctly clicked on the other, they did so within
seconds of one another (23% co-occurred within 3 s), which sug-
gests that we are dealing with cases of mutual attention that led to
mutual clicking (see Figure 4 in Froese et al., 2014). Yet when we
look at the distribution of clicking delays over the sequence of tri-
als (Figure S5), the picture becomes more complex: the increase
in the number of Joint Success trials is largely due to an increase
in Joint Success trials with mutual clicking delays longer than 10 s.
Presumably this is because participants have developed the capac-
ity for more sustained interactions, thus eliminating the need to
click as soon as possible when detecting the other’s presence. The
interaction process may also have become an interesting end in
itself, rather than just a secondary means for solving the clicking
task. Admittedly, it is difficult to objectively verify our intuitions.
As a first step toward a personal-level explanation for the ten-
dency of increasing joint clicking delays, we can evaluate whether
there are corresponding qualitative changes in the participants’
experience. As shown in Figure 6, there does indeed seem to be
a correlated change in the reported clarity with which the other’s
presence is perceived. While low to medium levels of clarity pre-
dominate during the first few trials, there is an increase in the
FIGURE 6 | Changes in the modified Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS)
ratings over the sequence of 15 trials. After each trial in which they
clicked, players were asked to give a PAS rating between 1 and 4: “Please
select a category to describe how clearly you experienced your partner at
the time you clicked: (1) No experience, (2) Vague impression, (3) Almost
clear experience, (4) Clear experience.”
number of reports of maximum clarity until these reports come
to predominate. Given that clicks in Single Success trials are most
frequently associated with low to medium levels of clarity (see
Figure 5 in Froese et al., 2014), this suggests that we are actually
dealing with a qualitative change in the kind of mutual interac-
tion that players engage in. Their engagements develop not only
to be longer, as suggested by the increase in Joint Success clicking
delays, but also more clearly social.
We expected that the nature of this qualitative shift in interac-
tion had something to do with the emergence of more structured
forms of co-regulated interactions, especially cases of turn-taking
and mutual imitation. However, applying the objective measure
of turn-taking described in our original study (see Supplementary
Information Section S3 for details), which we had used to demon-
strate that clearer experiences of the other player are preceded
by more pronounced turn-taking interaction, did not reveal a
very remarkable upward trend when viewed across trials, at least
not when we average the turn-taking measure across all 17 teams
(Figure S6). It may be that this measure is too crude to detect an
increase in the co-regulation of interaction. And it is also possible
that there are no general trends in turn-taking across teams; pair-
wise developments of mutual interactionmay be too idiosyncratic
for such averaging to be meaningful.
The second possibility is supported by a comparison of devel-
opments in each team’s clicking performance, which reveals that
there are indeed different clusters of expertise (Figure 7). Future
researchmay therefore be better served by focusing the diachronic
analyses on selected teams. For instance, if we examine the
changes in turn-taking performance of the best team alone we do
find a notable upward trend over time, which remains consistent
at least for one of the players (Figure 8). This is not the only case
with such an upward trend but, as already indicated by Figure S6,
it cannot be generalized. Many trials show no discernable trend,
and there is even an example of a downward trend. Moreover,
even this exemplary best case shows that the regular turn-taking
interactions that had slowly been established during the first half
of trials loose some of their regularity during the last 5 trials.
We note that this kind of transition is consistent with the
findings of research in dialogic joint activity: “since one of
the hallmarks of coordinated dialogue is its progressivity, the
development of procedural coordination necessarily involves the
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differentiation of interlocutors’ turns as coordination increases”
(Mills, 2014, pp. 161–162). This increasing differentiation may
also help to account for the facts that players click more conser-
vatively during the second half of trials, and that they click in a
less synchronized manner. As players implicitly learn how to co-
regulate their interaction, simple interactive synchrony changes
into more complex interpersonal synergy (Fusaroli et al., 2014).
FIGURE 7 | Changes in team performances over 15 trials. In each trial a
player can make a correct click (+1 point), a wrong click (−1 point), or no
click (no change). The final maximum possible team score is 30 (15 trials ×
2 correct clicks).
FIGURE 8 | Changes in amount of turn-taking of best team over 15
trials. For each correct click in each trial we calculated the amount of
turn-taking that had taken place between the players during the preceding
10 s (range [0, 1]). Crosses and diamonds represent turn-taking before
correct clicks by Pa and Pb, respectively. This team (E14) managed to score
27 points (see top line in Figure 7).
EVIDENCE FOR DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF SOCIAL AWARENESS
Following Reddy’s (2003) work on developmental psychology, we
hypothesized that participants’ social awareness emerges in situa-
tions of mutual attention, in which one’s awareness of the other’s
presence is first framed in terms of the other’s attention to one’s
self in general, followed by mutual attention to what one’s self
specifically does. We did not consider the further progression to
triadic joint attention.
An initial evaluation of participants’ first-person reports sug-
gested the possibility that there could be two distinct forms of
awareness of being the object of the other’s attention, namely
depending onwhether this awareness is mutually shared or not. In
some cases people described awareness of being the object of the
other’s attention, but without thematizing the other’s awareness
of this awareness. Such descriptions of an individualistic aware-
ness of being the other’s object of attention may simply be a
consequence of the technical specificities of the perceptual cross-
ing setup. An actively searching participant cannot in principle
distinguish between a completely immobile (or nonresponsive)
participant and the static (or shadow) object. This means that
there is a possibility of one participant having awareness of the
other’s attending presence, but without the other sharing in that
awareness of attention.
Nevertheless, we highlight that analogous situations exist in
human development. As Tronick discusses at length, a newborn
lacks control over its ownmovements to the point that “what he is
doing is messy – variable, unstable, disorganized” (2004, p. 307).
And Reddy considers non-responsiveness to be an intentional
action with which infants sometimes counter being the object of
other’s attention: “Infants can also be indifferent to others’ visual
attention, as anyone knows who, trying to engage a 2-month-
old, has had the infant glance expressionlessly at them and turn
away” (2005, p. 97). We can also consider cases of pathologi-
cal development. For example, Tronick (2004, p. 304) examines
the pathological apathy that is exhibited by chronically deprived
orphans. When attending to such individuals we may remain
unaware of the extent of their awareness of being the object of
our attention, even though they might actually be aware of our
attending presence.
We therefore defined three categories of experiencing the
other’s presence, which incrementally build on each other: (A)
individual awareness of being the object of the other’s attention,
(B) mutual awareness of being each other’s objects of attention,
and (C) mutual awareness of specific aspects of the interaction
being the object of joint attention. The categories overlap to some
extent, but essentially category A includes only reports of aware-
ness of the other’s self-directed actions, B additionally required
awareness of mutually responsive interaction, and C addition-
ally required awareness of joint attention on something specific
other than the selves, for example an arbitrary pattern of mutual
contacts that had acquired special communicative significance.
After each trial, participants could write as little or as much as
they wanted within 2min until the next trial started. The ques-
tionnaire sheet asked them to describe the sensation of having
encountered the other at the time of the click, and more generally
to describe the strategy they had used during the trial. There were
472 instances of a participant having voluntarily written at least
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some text after a trial. Mostly these were fragmentary statements,
with only very few responses consisting of several sentences.
Each of these responses was coded as belonging to one of the
three social awareness categories (A, B, or C) or not assigned
to a category (N/A). It was quite a challenge to categorize the
responses. Wherever possible we based our categorizations not
only on the brief description of the experience, but also on the
brief description of the strategy, as well as descriptions pro-
vided for preceding and subsequent trials (e.g., participants often
abbreviated by writing “same as above”). In cases where differ-
ent categories where implied by a description of an experience
compared to the stated strategy, for example if a participant only
reported having individual awareness of being the object of the
other’s attention although an interactive strategy was described,
the category of the experience took precedence. In order to get
an estimate of interobserver reliability, two of us (TF and HI)
independently did the coding. The results are shown in Table 1.
In total there were 308 coding agreements, which is 65% of all
responses. Given the frequency distribution of the four types of
codings (A, B, C or N/A), the expected percentage of agreement
is 29%. This gives an interobserver-reliability kappa of 0.51 (see
Supplementary Material Section S3 for calculations), which can
be interpreted as moderate agreement. Given the sparse responses
collected during the original study, this is probably all that can
be hoped for at this point. Moreover, it is encouraging that dis-
agreements tended to occur more frequently between consecutive
stages of awareness (i.e., between A and B, or B and C, rather
than A and C), which is to be expected given that the three cate-
gories build on each other. In the following we limit our analysis
to only those responses for which there was an agreement between
the two coders. First, in order to illustrate how people responded
and how we coded, we provide 10 examples for each of the three
categories in Tables 2–4, respectively.
TF and HI jointly classified 29, 58, and 70 responses as belong-
ing to categories A, B, C, respectively. Given that these three
categories can be interpreted as analogous to the first stages in
Table 1 | Coding of free-text responses.
Observer HI







F A 29 13 3 4 49
B 10 58 18 3 89
C 1 20 70 2 93
N/A 37 22 31 151 241
Total 77 113 122 160 472
There were 510 opportunities for giving free-text responses (15 trials × 17
teams × 2 players), out of which 472 resulted in some written text. Two exper-
imenters went through these responses with the aim of coding each into one
of three categories: (A) individual awareness of being the object of the other’s
attention, (B) mutual awareness of being each other’s objects of attention, and
(C) mutual awareness of specific aspects of the interaction being the object of
joint attention. If no category was applicable or there wasn’t sufficient text to
make a decision, the response was coded as N/A. Bold numbers represent the
number of responses for which the coders were in agreement.
the development of social awareness, from passive individual-
ity to active mutuality to co-regulated triangulation on a third
element, we expected there to be a corresponding increase in the
reported clarity of perceiving the other’s presence. Or to put it
differently, following the hypothesis formulated by Froese and Di
Paolo (2011), we expect there to be a correlation between the
extent of co-regulation and the sense of sociality in the experi-
ence. The increasing number of reports found for each category
already suggests this trend, since having a clearer experience of
the other makes it easier to report it. And we further confirmed
this hypothesis by evaluating the perceptual awareness scale (PAS)
ratings associated with each category.
In order to determine if there was a significant difference
between the average PAS ratings reported for the categories we
applied one-tailed, two-sample equal variance t-tests. There were
24, 56, and 68 PAS scores associated with the agreed categories
Table 2 | Category A: individual awareness of being the object of the
other’s attention.
Trial ID First-person report
E3T1Pa He touched me periodically.
E15T13Pb I felt that the partner actively searched for me.
E3T4Pb I feel his searching me.
E7T9Pb Again, I felt being inspected - an object was moving back
and forth across me.
E6T10Pb I encountered it at close positions. I am not sure but it tried
to survey me.
E2T1Pa Its movements didn’t seem random or recorded. He was
trying to find me. He was moving while staying on the
same area.
E14T3Pa I felt that the partner checked if I was the static object.
E1T11Pb She seemed to look for me and always come closer to me.
E1T5Pa The partner’s avatar was again moving around my avatar.
E6T15Pa I thought the partner wander around my position for a while
after touching me.
Ten exemplary first-person reports (emphasis added).
Table 3 | Category B: mutual awareness of being each other’s objects
of attention.
Trial ID First-person report
E14T1Pa I felt that it chased me.
E14T2Pb I felt that the partner was leading me.
E5T13Pa I felt I met with my partner.
E6T14Pb It stopped once to see how I react. After moving a bit, it came
to me. Probably it was the partner.
E3T12Pa Touched each other.
E1T9Pb She likes me!
E7T3Pb Thought we’re contacting each other.
E11T8Pa It followed me when I ran away.
E11T8Pb I had an impression that we are interacting for a long time.
E7T11Pb Felt like crossing each other.
Ten exemplary first-person reports (emphasis added).
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Table 4 | Category C: mutual awareness of specific aspects of the
interaction being the object of joint attention.
Trial ID First-person report
E2T10Pa We exchanged patterns so it was clear it was him.
E2T10Pb Found object that responded to my taataa, stop, taa-taa, etc.
E1T9Pa I think there was a turn-taking-like communication.
E1T10Pa It looks like we’ve established a way to communicate.
E10T14Pb The rhythm of touching was alternately exchanged.
E11T3Pb I made “zu-zu-zu” by moving left and right and stopped. The
partner moved in the same way and I felt “zu- zu- zu-”
E11T11Pa I thought we made a conversation.
E17T13Pa It did not cling but I felt that the partner sent the “zu-zu”
signal.
E16T11Pb The partner synchronized with time gaps that I sent.
E14T4Pa I felt the partner imitated me.
Ten exemplary first-person reports (emphasis added).
A, B, and C, respectively. The equality of variances was veri-
fied using an f -test for each comparison. The average reported
clarity of experiencing the other’s presence for category B experi-
ences was slightly but not significantly higher than for category A
(µA = 2.83;µB = 3.05; P = 0.15), but the average clarity for cat-
egory C was significantly higher than for category B (µC = 3.62;
P = 3.71× 10−6).
The fact that the clarity of social awareness associated with cat-
egories A and B was not significantly different suggests that these
categories may not be experienced as qualitatively distinct situ-
ations from the first-person perspective. This is consistent with
Reddy’s (2003) approach, which does not allow for a purely indi-
vidualistic awareness of being the object of the other’s attention
but treats such awareness as always alreadymutual to some extent.
Indeed, from what we have observed while running the study, it
does seem highly unusual for participants to remain completely
nonresponsive while being their partner’s object of attention.
Typically, after having received a few touches the subjects of atten-
tion quickly get pulled into a mutually responsive interaction. In
the following we therefore collapse categories A and B into a single
category of mutual awareness, category AB.
The final step of our analysis was to determine if experiences
belonging to categories AB and C actually followed a sequence.
Given the developmental sequence from AB to C, we expected
responses categorized as AB to be more frequent than C during
the initial trials. We may also expect that category C is more fre-
quent during later trials, although it does not necessarily have to
displace category AB since C can be seen as a more specific artic-
ulation of AB. These predictions are partially supported by the
data (Figure 9). In the first couple of trials there are indeed more
cases of AB than C. The frequency of C tends to increase over the
subsequent trials, but it never fully becomes the dominant cate-
gory. These findings are suggestive, but the trends are not that well
pronounced and may be biased by the small sample size.
Clearly, a proper evaluation of our hypothesis that the devel-
opmental stages of social awareness can be recapitulated using
this kind of experimental setup requires a more systematic col-
lection and analysis of subjective reports. Developmental studies
using the microgenetic method have long emphasized the need
for dense observations of individual cases (Siegler and Crowley,
1991). Due to the limited number of usable free-text responses,
and even less agreed upon codings, we averaged categorizations
across all 17 teams, whichmay have further obscured any idiosyn-
cratic team-based trends. Nevertheless, these tentative results at
least hold out the prospect that more distinguishable develop-
mental trends in social awareness could be discovered by studies
that are specially designed to elicit detailed first-person reports.
Participants could also be phenomenologically trained before-
hand to become more aware of their different kinds of experience
(Lutz, 2002). Another possibility is to interview them about
their experience using a specialized method (e.g., Petitmengin,
2006; Hurlburt, 2011). Biases associated with experimenters’
classifications of the written reports could be avoided by asking
participants to define and select categories that best describe their
own experiences (Lutz et al., 2002).
DISCUSSION
We have proposed that a suitably implemented perceptual cross-
ing paradigm can fill a gap in experimental psychology. Following
enactive theory, we hypothesized that we should find some-
thing akin to the main stages of development of social awareness
in infants recapitulated in adults if they are forced to implic-
itly relearn the skill of social perception. A sequence of three
categories was defined: (A) individual awareness of being the
object of the other’s attention, (B) mutual awareness of being
each other’s objects of attention, and (C) mutual awareness of
specific aspects of the interaction being the object of joint atten-
tion. The preliminary results we have presented suggest that our
FIGURE 9 | Changes in how participants described their social
awareness. Categorizations were based on brief free-text first-person
reports. Only cases where both coders agreed were considered. Category
AB: mutual awareness of being each other’s object of attention (combining
categories A and B). Category C: mutual awareness of joint attention to
aspects of the interaction.
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hypothesis has merit, although the methods still need refinement.
We found that there was an average increase in reported clarity
of social awareness over trials, but it is challenging to find an
objective explanation of this phenomenon. Turn-taking is only
partially responsible, and a team-based measure may be more
appropriate. We also found that there is no significant difference
between categories A and B in terms of the associated clarity of
social awareness, with only C being significantly clearer, which we
argued is in line with Reddy’s (2003) original proposal, although
evidently more precise phenomenological work is needed. At least
these diverse and complex results already have the benefit of
warning us against idealizing the phenomenon of development
as a linear sequence of independent stages.
Although it was difficult to find general trends across all teams,
many participants were able to sense the other’s attention to their
objective presence, and to engage in co-regulated interactions that
involved mutual attention, such as feeling being chased/being
led (see Table 3, rows 1 and 2, for descriptions by one team).
Some participants were able to further develop these co-regulated
engagements into communication games involving turn-taking
andmutual imitation, such as passing patterns of activity between
each other (see Table 4, rows 1 and 2, for reports by one team).
On the basis of such coordinated interactions apparently it even
became possible to perceive the other’s emotional state across the
HCI, as predicted by Lenay (2010).
For example, after trial 10 one player somewhat confidently
remarks: “I think I am pretty sure that I could communicate about
my intention” (E10T10Pa), and two trials later he writes: “Same
as before, but I felt that the partner is anxious” (E10T12Pa). Did
this player correctly make sense of his partner’s emotional state
of mind? Given the unfortunate scarcity of free-text descriptions
that were generated by the original experiment, it was usually
impossible to evaluate this kind of question. However, here we
happened to be lucky because after the next trial his partner
writes: “I think my click was correct but if this response was
autonomous object’s, I will get anxious” (E10T13Pb). In other
words, despite the extreme poverty of the stimulus provided by
this minimal HCI, namely a sequence of binary (on/off) tac-
tile sensations, one player seems to have correctly noticed some
anxiety in the other’s style of engagement.
This finding is consistent with studies showing our propensity
to discern intentional states on the basis of minimal movement
information (Blake and Shiffrar, 2007), such as detecting other
people’s emotions from the point-light displays of their dances
(Brownlow et al., 1997). It is still debated if this ability is best
explained as a direct perception of the other’s intentional state
in their behavioral expression (Stout, 2012), or if perception just
presents us with meaningless “surface behavior” that needs to be
cognitively penetrated to gain access to the underlying intentions
(Baldwin and Baird, 2001). We suggest that with this experimen-
tal setup social understanding might be productively analyzed as
a case of direct perception by interaction (De Jaegher, 2009). Due
to the constraints of the HCI it is impossible to discern the other’s
intentions without at the same time interacting with them, and
this interaction can evoke a felt sensation of the other’s mental
state. Using the terminology introduced to developmental psy-
chology by Stern (1998), we can describe this encounter as an
amodal perception of the other’s vitality affect in the activation
contours traced by theirmovements-in-interaction. The result is a
felt impression of the other’s state, e.g. “She likes me!” (E1T9Pb),
which in turn will modulate the perceiver’s expression, thereby
making an impression on the other, and so forth. Interacting
players are thereby able to create an intertwinement of embodied
affectivity, which is a form of embodied communication (Fuchs
and Koch, 2014). Movement and being moved both have spatial
and emotional components.
From this perspective we can also better understand why a
player would terminate an interaction that is too repetitive and
“mechanical” (see Figure 4C). The other player might keep faith-
fully replicating an already established signal, but without at the
same time allowing their movement to resonate with the other’s
changing expressions they fail to participate in a shared affec-
tive space. When the signal stops being grounded in a mutually
affecting situation it looses its communicative value; it becomes
an empty form that obscures rather than expresses the other’s
subjective presence. This example nicely shows the primacy of
embodied communication via interbodily resonance, in contrast
to the traditional starting premise of sending and receiving sym-
bolic signals across pre-defined channels. The importance of
common ground for the emergence of an embodied commu-
nication system has been observed before (Scott-Phillips et al.,
2009). Here we saw that it continues to be crucial even after the
establishment of that system in the interactive maintenance of its
meaningfulness.
However, we acknowledge that this interactive-perceptual
strategy is not the only way of realizing the task of locating
the partner. As we discussed previously (Froese et al., 2014),
one outstanding participant managed to get nearly perfect click-
ing scores while never reporting any direct perceptual awareness
of the other’s presence. Leaving the free-text boxes asking for
descriptions of his felt sensations entirely blank, he only provides
a few statements of his strategy that reveal the perspective of a
detached observer: “Because the partner generated intermittent
stimulation, I also reply the intermittent stimulation” (E15T2Pa).
Similarly, another participant insisted on relyingmore on an indi-
vidualist cognitive strategy: “Felt like it was him. But every time
I say feel, I must say I rely much more on thinking about my
strategy and sticking to it.” (E2T14Pb). But then again, the fact
that at least some more cognitivist strategies were employed is
not all that surprising. After all, participants were adults who in
real life already had fully developed social skills and who were
confronted with a breakdown of these skills, a breakdown that
could be expected to elicit more reflective awareness and cognitive
compensatory strategies (Dreyfus, 1991).
We note that accepting the importance of the individual is not
a problem for this framework because the interactive turn in cog-
nitive science is not a return to the old days of behaviorism or
some kind of extremist externalism. The internal organization of
agents is a central concern of the enactive approach to social cog-
nition (Froese and Di Paolo, 2011). Neither is this concession
to the individual and its internal milieu a return to the classi-
cal internalism of cognitivism, since all behavior is conceived of
as a dynamical property of embodied and situated minds (Beer,
2000). The perceptual crossing paradigm thus provides a platform
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for gaining a better understand of the diversity of individual and
interactive styles that exist. These differences were mainly ignored
in the current analysis because we were looking for statistically
significant trends that were averaged over players and teams.
Apart from confirming the preliminary results presented here,
it would be interesting to use this approach to investigate other
hypotheses about the development of social awareness. For
instance, Stern (1998, pp. 56,57) assigns developmental primacy
to amodal perception of the other’s vitality affects over modal
perception of overt acts and objects. Future work could attempt
to use the current approach to study the developmental trajec-
tory from the former to the latter. In addition, studies have found
differences in phenomenology between people from an Eastern
and Western cultural background, including divergences in their
development of social experiences (Cohen et al., 2007). Although
our study included participants from these two backgrounds, we
did not distinguish between these groups. Conducting a between-
group experiment might reveal differences in their development
of social awareness. Finally, it is an interesting open question
whether it is possible to modify the perceptual crossing paradigm
so as to allow for the emergence of secondary intersubjectivity
(Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978), including the triangulation of
joint attention on external objects, which is predicted to follow
after the stages of mutual awareness that we have described here
(Reddy, 2005).
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This study was partially funded by KAKENHI grant number
25560430.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL




Auvray, M., Lenay, C., and Stewart, J. (2009). Perceptual interactions in
a minimalist virtual environment. New Ideas Psychol. 27, 32–47. doi:
10.1016/j.newideapsych.2007.12.002
Auvray, M., and Myin, E. (2009). Perception with compensatory devices: from
sensory substitution to sensorimotor extension. Cogn. Sci. 33, 1036–1058. doi:
10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01040.x
Auvray, M., and Rohde, M. (2012). Perceptual crossing: the simplest online
paradigm. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:181. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00181
Baldwin, D. A., and Baird, J. A. (2001). Discerning intentions in dynamic human
action. Trends Cogn. Sci. 5, 171–178. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01615-6
Beer, R. D. (2000). Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4,
91–99. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(99)01440-0
Blake, R., and Shiffrar, M. (2007). Perception of humanmotion. Annu. Rev. Psychol.
58, 47–73. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190152
Bottineau, D. (2010). “Language and enaction,” in Enaction: Toward a New
Paradigm for Cognitive Science, eds J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. Di Paolo
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), 267–306.
Brownlow, S., Dixon, A. R., Egbert, C. A., and Radcliffe, R. D. (1997). Perception
of movement and dancer characteristics from point-light displays of dance.
Psychol. Rec. 47, 411–421.
Cohen, D., Hoshino-Browne, E., and Leung, A. K.-Y. (2007). “Culture and the
structure of personal experience: insider and outsider phenomenologies of the
self and social world,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed M.
Zanna (San Diego, CA: Academic Press), 1–67.
Cuffari, E. (2014). “On being mindful about misunderstandings in languaging:
making sense of non-sense as the way to sharing linguistic meaning,” in Enactive
Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making: Making Sense of Non-Sense, eds M.
Cappuccio and T. Froese (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan), 207–237.
Davoli, C. C., Brockmole, J. R., and Witt, J. K. (2012). Compressing perceived dis-
tance with remote tool-use: real, imagined, and remembered. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percept. Perform. 38, 80–89. doi: 10.1037/a0024981
De Jaegher, H. (2009). Social understanding through direct perception? Yes, by
interacting. Conscious. Cogn. 18, 535–542. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.10.007
De Jaegher, H., and Di Paolo, E. A. (2007). Participatory sense-making: an enac-
tive approach to social cognition. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 6, 485–507. doi:
10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9
Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M., and Iizuka, H. (2008). Sensitivity to social contingency
or stability of interaction? Modelling the dynamics of perceptual crossing. New
Ideas Psychol. 26, 278–294. doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2007.07.006
Dreyfus, H. L. (1991). Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and
Time, Division 1. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Fogel, A. (1993).Developing Through Relationships: Origins of Communication, Self,
and Culture. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Franco, C., and Colinvaux-De-Dominguez, D. (1992). Genetic epistemology,
history of science and science education. Sci. Educ. 1, 255–271. doi:
10.1007/BF00430276
Froese, T., and Di Paolo, E. A. (2011). The enactive approach: theoretical sketches
from cell to society. Pragm. Cogn. 19, 1–36. doi: 10.1075/pc.19.1.01fro
Froese, T., and Fuchs, T. (2012). The extended body: a case study in the neu-
rophenomenology of social interaction. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 11, 205–235.
doi: 10.1007/s11097-012-9254-2
Froese, T., and Gallagher, S. (2012). Getting interaction theory (IT) together: inte-
grating developmental, phenomenological, enactive, and dynamical approaches
to social interaction. Interact. Stud. 13, 436–468. doi: 10.1075/is.13.3.
06fro
Froese, T., Gould, C., and Barrett, A. (2011). Re-viewing from within: a com-
mentary on first- and second-person methods in the science of consciousness.
Construct. Found. 6, 254–269. Available online at: http://www.univie.ac.at/
constructivism/journal/6/2/254.froese
Froese, T., Iizuka, H., and Ikegami, T. (2014). Embodied social interaction consti-
tutes social cognition in pairs of humans: a minimalist virtual reality experi-
ment. Sci. Rep. 4:3672. doi: 10.1038/srep03672
Froese, T., Stanghellini, G., and Bertelli, M. O. (2013). Is it normal to be a principal
mindreader? Revising theories of social cognition on the basis of schizophre-
nia and high functioning autism-spectrum disorders. Res. Dev. Disabil. 34,
1376–1387. doi: 10.1016/j.ridd.2013.01.005
Froese, T., Suzuki, K., Ogai, Y., and Ikegami, T. (2012). Using human-computer
interfaces to investigate “mind-as-it-could-be” from the first-person perspec-
tive. Cogn. Comp. 4, 365–382. doi: 10.1007/s12559-012-9153-4
Fuchs, T. (2013). The phenomenology and development of social perspectives.
Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 12, 655–683. doi: 10.1007/s11097-012-9267-x
Fuchs, T., and Koch, S. C. (2014). Embodied affectivity: on moving and being
moved. Front. Psychol. 5:508. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00508
Fusaroli, R., Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, J., and Tylén, K. (2014). Dialog as interpersonal
synergy. New Ideas Psychol. 32, 147–157. doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2013.
03.005
Galantucci, B., and Garrod, S. (2011). Experimental semiotics: a review. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 5:11. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2011.00011
Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Conscious.
Cogn. 17, 535–543. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.003
Gallagher, S. (2008b). Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors.
Philos. Explor. 11, 163–174. doi: 10.1080/13869790802239227
Gallagher, S. (2013). The socially extended mind. Cogn. Syst. Res. 25–26, 4–12. doi:
10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.008
Gallagher, S., and Hutto, D. D. (2008). “Understanding others through pri-
mary interaction and narrative practice,” in The Shared Mind: Perspectives on
Intersubjectivity, eds J. Zlatev, P. Racine, C. Sinha, and E. Itkonen. (Amsterdam:
John Benjamins), 17–38.
Havelange, V. (2010). “The ontological constitution of cognition and the epis-
temological constitution of cognitive science: phenomenology, enaction, and
technology,” in Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, eds J.
Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. Di Paolo (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press),
335–359.
Hurlburt, R. T. (2011). Investigating Pristine Inner Experience: Moments of Truth.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1061 | 12
Froese et al. Interactive development of social awareness
Iizuka, H., Marocco, D., Ando, H., and Maeda, T. (2013). Experimental study on
co-evolution of categorical perception and communication systems in humans.
Psychol. Res. 77, 53–63. doi: 10.1007/s00426-012-0420-5
Jack, A. I., and Roepstorff, A. (2003). Why trust the subject? J. Conscious. Stud. 10,
v–xx.
Krueger, J. (2012). Seeing mind in action. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 11, 149–173. doi:
10.1007/s11097-011-9226-y
Lenay, C. (2010). “It’s so touching”: emotional value in distal contact. Int. J. Des.
4, 15–25. Available online at: http://www.ijdesign.org/ojs/index.php/IJDesign/
article/view/694
Lenay, C., Gapenne, O., Hanneton, S., Marque, C., and Genouëlle, C. (2003).
“Sensory substitution: limits and perspectives,” in Touching for Knowing:
Cognitive Psychology of Haptic Manual Perception, eds Y. Hatwell, A. Streri, and
E. Gentaz (Amsterdam: John Benjamins), 275–292. doi: 10.1075/aicr.53.22len
Lenay, C., and Steiner, P. (2010). Beyond the internalism/externalism debate: the
constitution of the space of perception. Conscious. Cogn. 19, 938–952. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2010.06.011
Lutz, A. (2002). Toward a neurophenomenology of generative passages:
a first empirical case study. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 1, 133–167. doi:
10.1023/A:1020320221083
Lutz, A., Lachaux, J.-P., Martinerie, J., and Varela, F. J. (2002). Guiding the study
of brain dynamics by using first-person data: synchrony patterns correlate with
ongoing conscious states during a simple visual task. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
99, 1586–1591. doi: 10.1073/pnas.032658199
Lymer, J. (2011). Merleau-Ponty and the affective maternal-foetal relation.
Parrhesia 13, 126–143.
Mcgann, M. (2010). Perceptual modalities: modes of presentation or modes of
interaction? J. Conscious. Stud. 17, 72–94.
Mcgann, M., and De Jaegher, H. (2009). Self-other contingencies: enacting social
perception. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 8, 417–437. doi: 10.1007/s11097-009-9141-7
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). “The child’s relations with others,” in The Primacy of
Perception, ed J. M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press), 96–158.
Merritt, M. (2014). “Making non(sense) of gender,” in Enactive Cognition at the
Edge of Sense-Making: Making Sense of Non-Sense, eds M. Cappuccio and T.
Froese (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan), 285–306.
Michael, J., and Overgaard, S. (2012). Interaction and social cognition: a comment
on Auvray et al.’s perceptual crossing paradigm.New Ideas Psychol. 30, 296–299.
doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2012.02.001
Miller, P. H., and Coyle, T. R. (1999). “Developmental change: lessons from micro-
genesis,” in Conceptual Development: Piaget’s Legacy, eds E. Kofsky Scholnick,
K. Nelson, S. A. Gelman, and P. H. Miller (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum),
209–239.
Mills, G. J. (2014). Dialogue in joint activity: complementarity, convergence
and conventionalization. New Ideas Psychol. 32, 158–173. doi: 10.1016/j.
newideapsych.2013.03.006
Murray, L., and Trevarthen, C. (1985). “Emotional regulations of interactions
between two-month-olds and their mothers,” in Social Perception in Infants, eds
T. M. Field and N. A. Fox (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing), 177–197.
Nadel, J., Carchon, I., Kervella, C., Marcelli, D., and Réserbat-Plantey, D. (1999).
Expectancies for social contingency in 2-month-olds. Dev. Sci. 2, 164–173. doi:
10.1111/1467-7687.00065
Noë, A. (2004). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
O’Regan, J. K., and Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and
visual consciousness. Behav. Brain Sci. 24, 939–1031. doi: 10.1017/S0140525
X01000115
Oullier, O., and Kelso, J. A. S. (2009). “Social coordination, from the perspective
of coordination dynamics,” in Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science,
ed R. A. Meyers (New York, NY: Springer), 8198–8212. doi: 10.1007/978-0-387-
30440-3_486
Petitmengin, C. (2006). Describing one’s subjective experience in the second per-
son: An interview method for the science of consciousness. Phenomenol. Cogn.
Sci. 5, 229–269. doi: 10.1007/s11097-006-9022-2
Ramsøy, T. Z., and Overgaard, M. (2004). Introspection and subliminal perception.
Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 3, 1–23. doi: 10.1023/B:PHEN.0000041900.30172.e8
Ratcliffe, M. (2007). Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk
Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Reddy, V. (2003). On being the object of attention: implications for self-other
consciousness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 397–402. doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(03)
00191-8
Reddy, V. (2005). “Before the ‘third element’: understanding attention to self,” in
Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds, eds N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T.
McCormack, and J. Roessler (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 85–109.
doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0005
Reddy, V., and Morris, P. (2004). Participants don’t need theories: knowing minds
in engagement. Theory Psychol. 14, 647–665. doi: 10.1177/0959354304046177
Riley, M. A., Richardson, M. J., Shockley, K., and Ramenzoni, V. C. (2011).
Interpersonal synergies. Front. Psychol. 2:38. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00038
Rosenthal, V. (2004). “Microgenesis, immediate experience and visual processing
in reading,” in Seeing, Thinking and Knowing: Meaning and Self-Organisation
in Visual Cognition and Thought, ed A. Carsetti (Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic
Publishers), 221–243. doi: 10.1007/1-4020-2081-3_11
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., et al.
(2013). Toward a second-person neuroscience. Behav. Brain Sci. 36, 393–462.
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X12000660
Scott-Phillips, T. C., Kirby, S., and Ritchie, G. R. S. (2009). Signalling signal-
hood and the emergence of communication. Cognition 113, 226–233. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2009.08.009
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1999). The Primacy of Movement. Amsterdam, Netherlands:
John Benjamins Publishing Company. doi: 10.1075/aicr.14
Siegler, R. S., and Crowley, K. (1991). The microgenetic method: a direct means for
studying cognitive development. Am. Psychol. 46, 606–620. doi: 10.1037/0003-
066X.46.6.606
Stern, D. N. (1998). The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from
Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology. London, UK: H. Karnac.
Stewart, J. (2010). “Foundational issues in enaction as a paradigm for cognitive sci-
ence: from the origin of life to consciousness and writing,” in Enaction: Toward
a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, eds J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. Di
Paolo (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), 1–31.
Stout, R. (2012). What someone’s behavior must be like if we are to be aware of
their emotions in it. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. 11, 135–148. doi: 10.1007/s11097-
011-9224-0
Thompson, E. (2001). Empathy and consciousness. J. Conscious. Stud. 8, 1–32.
Trevarthen, C. (1979). “Communication and cooperation in early infancy: a
description of primary intersubjectivity,” in Before Speech, ed M. Bullowa
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 321–347.
Trevarthen, C., and Hubley, P. (1978). “Secondary intersubjectivity: confidence,
confiding and acts of meaning in the first year,” in Action, Gesture and
Symbol: The Emergence of Language, ed A. Lock (London, UK: Academic Press),
183–229.
Trevarthen, C., and Reddy, V. (2007). “Consciousness in infants,” in The Blackwell
Companion to Consciousness, eds M. Velmans and S. Schneider (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing), 41–57.
Tronick, E. (2004). “Why is connection with others so critical? The formation of
dyadic states of consciousness and the expansion of individuals’ states of con-
sciousness: coherence governed selection and the co-creation of meaning out of
messy meaning making,” in Emotional Development: Recent Research Advances,
eds J. Nadel and D.W. Muir (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 293–316.
Wegner, D. M., and Giuliano, T. (1982). “The forms of social awareness,” in
Personality, Roles, and Social Behavior, eds W. J. Ickes and E. S. Knowles (New
York, NY: Springer), 165–198. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4613-9469-3_6
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 20 May 2014; accepted: 04 September 2014; published online: 26 September
2014.
Citation: Froese T, Iizuka H and Ikegami T (2014) Using minimal human-computer
interfaces for studying the interactive development of social awareness. Front. Psychol.
5:1061. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01061
This article was submitted to Cognitive Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Froese, Iizuka and Ikegami. This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this jour-
nal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1061 | 13
